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Abstract: Humans, because they are self-conscious, have the
capacity to take control over their own behaviour in a way that
non-self-conscious entities, such as the local cow, do not.
However, if we do not clearly understand how humans can do
this, we will never be able to fully activate that potential.  In
what is to follow, the change in the value dynamic will be
traced from the initial position in which humans respond - like
any animate being - to the values in their environment, to the
emergence of learned responses as a function of purposeful
reinforcement, to the emergence of ‘self-control’ in which self-
conscious language-users borrow values from significant others,
and finally to the emergence of genuine autonomy, when self-
conscious agents are able to free their practical judgements
from external influence by thinking through value issues
impartially. Since thinking through an issue impartially is the
sine qua non mark of philosophical thinking, it would appear
that learning how to think philosophically is of particular
importance to agents who wish to maximise their potential for
autonomy.
In Order to Harness Freedom, One Must
Understand It
In comparison to most others entities in the animal
kingdom, the characteristic that makes humans unique is
the capacity for self-consciousness.  Both ethically and
legally we recognise this characteristic as bringing with it
the capacity to choose and, hence, the capacity to take
responsibility for one’s actions. As self-conscious entities,
humans thus have the capacity to ‘become their own
persons’ - to be ‘creators of themselves.’  Humans have
the capacity to become autonomous. However, this
capacity is merely that – a capacity, or a potentiality.  In
order for that potential to be fully actualised, it must first
be understood. In order for self-conscious agents to take
more control over their own capacity for freedom - and
in so doing acquire a kind of second-order freedom, i.e.,
the freedom to maximise their own freedom - they must
fully appreciate the mechanics that underpin the
evolution of this qualitative difference in behavioural
control.
The Dynamics of Value
The most fundamental axiom that needs to be grasped in
order to understand human action is that value creates
all animate behaviour. Animals are originally set in
motion, and are kept in motion, by value.  Animals can
be described as being set in motion by value in the sense
that all animals begin life pre-programmed so that they
respond to a range of objects and/or situations that are
saturated with value.  The shape of a hawk is saturated
with a natural negative value for a gosling,1   a smile has
a natural positive value for young humans.  Through
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association, or learning, other objects and situations
borrow value from the original ‘sign stimuli.’  The
resulting behaviour is more complex but the behaviour
nonetheless remains totally determined by ‘percepts that
are saturated with value,’ or what are more commonly
referred to as ‘external stimuli.’
This behaviour/value dialectic can be illuminated
through an analogy with colour.  Let’s presume that all
animals are pre-programmed so that red is appetitive
(i.e. red elicits an approach response) and blue is aversive
(i.e. blue elicits an avoidance response). With association,
red and blue rub off on various objects and situations so
that, with extensive experience, an animal’s environment
becomes a riot of colour with many shades and variations
of red, blue, and purple.  Were we to have the appropriate
metaphysical glasses, we would be able to predict an
animal’s behaviour merely by seeing the colours of its
world.  We would know, for instance, that a vibrant red
would be extremely appetitive, a pale blue mildly
aversive, while we would predict that a deep purple
would elicit a highly ambivalent response.
What is important to note with regard to the learning
process is that value moves from object to object, or
situation to situation, as a result of association.2   What is
also important to note with regard to the learning process
is that this association can transpire either naturally, or
as a result of contrived pairing.  The modification of the
behaviour of wild animals takes place entirely as a result
of natural association, with the result being a ‘fit’ between
the animal and the environment that it inhabits. A
domestic pet, on the other hand, is also subject to
purposeful pairing.  A domestic pet therefore learns to fit
into its social setting as well as its natural environment.
The basic dynamic of behavioural control in both these
situations, however, remains the same.  The behaviour of
both wild and domestic animals is totally determined by
values that adhere to external percepts.
With the emergence of self-consciousness,3  the dynamics
of value begin to change.  Initially, the very young pre-
linguistic human, like a domestic pet, is subject to
behaviour-modification both by natural association and
purposeful pairing.  However, as the child matures
cognitively and develops language, a qualitative change
in the dynamics of value occurs.  What happens now is
that instead of a caregiver merely trying to ‘repaint’ the
values of a child’s environment directly, now the
caregiver, through symbolic interaction, tries to infuse
1 See Schneirla, T.C. (1965) Aspects of Stimulation and Organisation
in Approach/Withdrawal Processes Underlying Vertebrate
Behaviour Development, in Advances in the Study of Behaviour, Vol. 1
(pp. 1-74)
2 See various writings on classical conditioning, for example, D.
Bindra, ‘A Unified Account of Classical Conditioning and Operant
Training,’ in A.H. Black and W.F. Prokasy (eds.), Classical
Conditioning II: Current Research and Theory.  New York: Appleton-
Crofts, 1972, pp. 453-481.
3 This account of self-consciousness finds its roots in the works of
G. H. Mead, On Social Psychology. A. Strauss (ed.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1934.  Mead’s work gave rise to a
movement referred to as Symbolic Interactionism.  The reader will
note that the  term ‘symbolic interaction’ is used frequently in the
present work.
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values into the child (rather than directly into the child’s
world) in the hope that the child herself will project those
values into relevant situations, and in so doing be moved
by them.
Let us follow this change in the dynamic of value through
an example. Let us suppose that a mother, Mrs Smith,
initially trains her child, Mary, through a typical
association programme; smiles and hugs for all the
desired behaviours, and negative ‘no’s’ for actions that
she hopes to eliminate.  With cognitive maturity and the
development of language, however, Mrs Smith begins to
explain to Mary, that, for instance, generosity is a virtue
and that therefore Mary ought always to share her
possessions with her playmates.  In subsequent play
situations, even if Mrs Smith is absent, we can presume
that though a new toy will serve as a strong behaviour-
eliciting stimulus for Mary, a projected image of a greatly
admired child generously sharing her toys with her
playmates will also exert an appetitive pull. What is
happening here, in other words, is that a projected image
of the self serves as a behaviour-eliciting stimulus that
competes with the ‘external’4  behaviour-eliciting stimuli
in the child’s environment. If the self-projected stimulus
overrides the external stimuli, Mary can be described as
having gained self-control.
From a metaphysical point of view, the emergence of
‘self-control’ can be described as dramatic; from an
everyday point of view, however, this drama is usually
utterly invisible.  This is so because, on the surface, there
is no obvious difference between, for example, Mary
refraining from being selfish with her toys because it
conflicts with her mother’s worldview, and a dog ceasing
to chew on shoes because the behaviour was paired with
a wallop.  However, the difference is dramatic, and that
drama resides in the potentiality of the former that is
absent from the latter. Clearly the latter, i.e., learning that
results merely from physical association is relatively
crude and limited.  On the one hand, one can only carry
out just so many pairings, and, on the other, in order for
an animal to be ‘trained,’ it must first produce the
behaviour that one wants to positively, or aversively,
reinforce.  As well, the whole procedure must be done
with great precision so that one actually reinforces the
desired behaviour rather than a closely associated one.  If
Rover hesitates before coming, the subsequent treat may
reinforce the hesitation rather than obedience.
By comparison, values that emerge as a result of linguistic
interaction are more malleable, complex, and precise, to
say nothing of the virtually miraculous fact that learning
can transpire in the imagination rather than in actuality.
Because self-conscious entities can imagine themselves
in the future, they can imagine themselves doing both
desired and undesired actions and, through symbolic
interaction, others can pair those behaviours with positive
or negative reinforcement.  Thus, for example, in the
above situation, if Mary had been a dog rather than a
human child, the only way Mrs Smith could have
produced the desired ‘sharing response’ would have been
to somehow elicit a ‘sharing’ response and then positively
reinforce it (though, as we dog-lovers know, eliciting a
genuine sharing response from a dog is well neigh
impossible).  However, since Mary is self-conscious and
is capable of symbolic interaction, her mother’s words
can not only conjure up an image of Mary sharing her
toys, her mother’s words can also conjure up an image of
mother being mightily impressed by the fact that Mary is
sharing her toys.  Learning can thus take place in Mary’s
imagination.  No actual behaviour or actual reinforcement
need take place.
From a collective viewpoint, the evolutionary payoff of
being able to undergo such complicated and precise
learning without having to play it out in actuality is
enormous.  Such entities are able to co-ordinate their
actions in a way that is far more complex and layered
than entities that only learn through physical association.
From an individual point of view, however, at least in
terms of autonomy, entities seem to be going the wrong
way.  That is, precisely because self-conscious entities are
able to undergo such complicated and precise learning,
self-conscious entities appear to be subject to far more
powerful and sophisticated external sources of behaviour-
modification than their non-self-conscious counterparts.
Rather than moving individuals toward autonomy, the
emergence of self-consciousness appears to bring with it
a kind of ‘over-determination.’  Though self-conscious
entities have a capacity for ‘self-control’ which non-self-
conscious entities do not, we need to keep firmly in mind
that this so-called5  ‘self-control’ is really behaviour that
results from projected values that have been introjected
from others.  This is, as it were, number painting with the
design and colour scheme being pre-determined.
Individuals are not really painting their own worlds; they
are not in charge of their own practical judgements.
The term  ‘self-control’ is thus a misnomer.  The
emergence of ‘self-control’ is really the emergence of a
finely tuned social control.  Unlike animals in the wild
that are controlled by the values that adhere to the natural
environment, and unlike domestic pets that are controlled
by the natural environment and contrived pairing, self-
conscious entities are controlled by the natural
environment, and contrived paring, and introjected
values that they themselves project into the environment.
How can such entities reach for autonomy?
If the ultimate value for self-conscious entities is
autonomy, it appears that there is irony in the route.  In
their pursuit of autonomy, it would seem that self-
conscious entities must first go deeper into the quagmire
of determination before arising out of it.  This is so
because, paradoxically, the capacity for self-
consciousness, symbolic interaction, and value projection
- all of which are necessary for autonomy - first tighten
the puppet strings.  This is the risk of self-consciousness.
If one loses oneself in the journey, one is even further
from the epitome to which individual humans can aspire
than one was at the beginning.
4 ‘External’ has been put in quotes so as to signal that the force of
any external stimulus is also a function of the internal state of the
conscious being.  For example, the appetitive pull of food is at least
partially a function of the degree to which the conscious being in
question is hungry.
5 This capacity for ‘internal control’ is generally referred to as ‘self-
control’ by contemporary psychologists and laypersons alike, e.g.,
‘In losing his temper, he showed a distinct lack of self-control.’
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Getting Control of One’s Own Values
It is value that moves behaviour.  Thus if one wants to
control one’s own behaviour, one must get control over
one’s values. How does one do that?
The first step that is necessary in order to take control
over one’s behaviour is to understand clearly how others,
heretofore, have controlled one’s behaviour.  Others have
controlled one’s behaviour either by literal purposeful
pairing, or through symbolic pairing, i.e., dialogue.
Trying to take control over one’s own behaviour by literal
purposeful paring is rare.  For one thing it is crude; for
another, it implies that one must resort to treating oneself
as a pre-linguistic animal. However, in some instances
such literal purposeful pairing is appropriate. Some
alcoholics, for instance, resort to pairing highly aversive
stimuli, e.g., drugs that produce severe nausea, with
alcohol intake, in an effort to conquer their addiction.
The most effective way to take control over one’s
behaviour, however, is to take control over one’s own
reasoning processes.  Others have plugged into one’s
reasoning processes by pairing, through symbolic
interaction, an imagined action with an imagined
reinforcement, either positive or negative.  That
reinforcement, or value, is what we call a reason. ‘You
ought not to do ‘x’ because others will think ill of you,’
‘you ought to do ‘y’ because it will help you flourish,’ and
so on. The word ‘because’ signals a reason. In theoretical
reasoning, the word ‘because’ signals a reference to a
matter of fact, e.g., the bridge collapsed because the cable
snapped. However, in practical reasoning, i.e., reasoning
about how one ought or ought not to act, the word
‘because’ ultimately signals a reference to a value.  The
reference may not be direct, but it will eventually get
there.  Thus, though the ‘because’ in the claim ‘you ought
to contact your grandmother because she is dying’
directly refers to a matter of fact, i.e., that your
grandmother is dying, it indirectly refers to the value
that ‘one ought always to try and make contact with
people (or relatives) who are dying.’6   Practical reasoning
must eventually end with a reference to a value because
the only thing that moves behaviour is value.
Autonomy thus requires that one learn how to reason
with oneself about practical issues. However to say, i.e.,
that ‘autonomy requires that one learn how to reason
with oneself about practical issues,’ is not to say that one
must simply learn how to supply oneself with reasons. If
autonomy is the goal, then there is a certain kind of
reasoning that must be mastered, and that is the kind of
reasoning that neutralises outside influence. After all, to
be autonomous means that one can make decisions by
oneself; that one’s decisions are not influenced by outside
pressures. Reasoning that is not influenced by outside
pressure is impartial reasoning.  Autonomy requires, in
other words, that one learn to reason impartially.
Autonomy requires that one follow reasons  (as opposed
to wishful thinking or preconceived ideas) where they
lead.  Autonomy requires that one become a reasonable
individual. Thus, to say that ‘autonomy requires that one
learn how to reason with oneself about practical issues’ is
to say that, if autonomy is the goal, an individual must
learn to think through issues impartially - an individual
must become a reasonable person, i.e., follow reasons
where they lead.
Different Value Histories
Learning to reason impartially with oneself is no easy
feat.  To begin with, there are often overwhelming reasons
why one is loath to follow reasons where they lead.  The
conclusion to which reasons point may appear to be
counter to one’s own short term best interests, or contrary
to the beliefs held by one’s reference group.  However,
perhaps more importantly, learning to reason impartially
may be difficult because one has rarely been exposed to
it.  In fact, quite the contrary is too often the case.  Many
young humans, unhappily, are chronically exposed to
utterly biased reasoning, i.e., the sort of cognitive trickery
that distorts reasons so that they fit preconceived
conclusions.
That young humans are often exposed to ‘unreasonable’
environments is not always evident.  This is so because it
is often assumed, incorrectly, that children who are
exposed to ‘talking’ are exposed to reasoning.  That is,
with regard to parenting styles, parents often assume that
there are two main methods (a false dilemma as it turns
out): either use physical force to obtain discipline, or talk
to your children.  Those who pick the latter assume that
the result will be a ‘reasonable’ child.  This is a false
assumption.  Talking with one’s child is not the same as
reasoning with one’s child.  Talking parents often engage
in dialogue with the assumption that the aim is to get the
child to do the parents’ will. Going into a dialogue with
the aim of getting anyone to do one’s will is not going
into a dialogue with reasoning in mind. It is going into
a dialogue with manipulation in mind.  Going into a
dialogue with reasoning in mind is to go into a dialogue
with the assumption that both parties will follow reasons
where they lead.  Participants, of course, may assume
that they can predict where the reasons will lead, but
participants must, nonetheless, be prepared to genuinely
explore one another’s points of view and to allow reasons
- not persons - to adjudicate.  In a reasoning dialogue, all
participants must believe that it is reasons - not persons
- that rule.  If children are exposed over a long period of
time to dialogues in which reason rules, they will believe
- to their very core - that should their reasons for wishing
to do, or not to do, anything have overwhelming merit,
their parents will happily support them.  Children
exposed in this way to dialogues in which reason rules
will never believe that any decision is arbitrary, or that
sheer power has any influence.
If parents honour the rule of reason,7  their offspring are
liable to do likewise.  Rebellion is only necessary against
arbitrary power.  When people - as opposed to reasons -
rule, then there will always be a subliminal war as to
who has the upper hand.  If parents - as persons - rule,
they can expect that their children will eventually try to
6 Practice in finding ‘hidden premises’ (a common exercise in most
‘Critical Thinking’ courses) is necessary if one is to become
competent in seeing the values that anchor practical reasoning.
7 In is important to understand that learning through reasoning is
only one kind of learning, amongst other kinds of learning, that
ought to take place in childhood.  The sort of learning that ought to
take place in any given situation is a function both of the dynamics
of the situation and the state and maturity of the individuals
involved.  Attempting to use reason when a toddler is overwhelmed
by massive stimulus overload, for example, is clearly inappropriate.
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wrest that authority from them. Such rebellion, of course,
is rarely in the name of genuine autonomy.  Such rebellion
is usually merely an attempt to move from the ‘frying
pan’ of being finely socially attuned to one’s parents, to
the ‘fire’ of being finely socially attuned to one’s pals.
Unhappily many parents try to avoid rebellious
confrontation by abdicating parental authority altogether,
i.e., letting their kids do virtually whatever they want.
Such a disastrous environment predictably breeds
undisciplined self-centred individuals.  Autonomy is not
nurtured in a jungle.
If the goal is to create an environment which will nourish
‘reasonableness,’ the answer lies not in merely talking to
one’s children, nor does it lie in not expecting a lot from
one’s offspring. If the goal is to create an environment
which will nourish ‘reasonableness,’ the answer lies not
in creating rules and then trying to talk one’s offspring
into them, nor does it lie in creating no rules at all. The
answer is to honour the rule of reason.  Children who
are chronically exposed to dialogue in which reason rules
will become highly disciplined reasonable individuals
who have been given the tools to genuinely aspire to the
best that humans can be.  Children who are chronically
exposed to dialogue in which reason rules can, with ease
and grace, become their own persons; they can with ease
and grace soar to autonomy. Children who are chronically
exposed to dialogue in which reason rules will be able to
decide for themselves, in whatever unique circumstances
they find themselves, what is needed in order to be the
best that they can be.
Locating One’s Own Position
Understanding the value dynamic, and knowing the
quality of one’s own ‘value background,’ is important as
it allows one to estimate where one is in the dynamic of
value.  Locating one’s own position within the value
dynamic is important as it can alert individuals to the
degree of difficulty that they will likely encounter in their
aspirations to becoming the best to which individual
humans can aspire.  Those who have never seen reason
rule will be reticent to try the route at all.  Those who
have been chronically exposed to linguistic manipulation
will frequently spin their wheels on an ingrained and
distracting belief that the point of reasoning is to persuade
others to see issues as they do, or to get others to do their
bidding.  The lucky ones will have already experienced
the excitement of following reasons where they lead, and
hence will also have experienced a growing confidence
in themselves as thinkers, as well as in the content of
their thought. The lucky ones will have had a glimpse of
freedom.  However, regardless of one’s present starting
point, and the potential pitfalls in the journey ahead, if
one can estimate where one is, as well as the inherent
dangers that are yet to be faced, and if one keeps one’s
vision firmly on the goal, autonomy ought to be possible
for most.
How Is Freedom Possible?
Since you are a physical object, you are subject to the
same physical laws as other physical objects. In that sense
you are determined.  Since you are a biological being,
you are also subject to biochemical laws that govern other
biological beings, and to that extent you are determined.
Since you are a learning animal, you are subject to the
same ‘passions’ as other animals, i.e., the values that
saturate your world willy nilly elicit behaviour from you
in that same way that behaviour is elicited from the lion
in the jungle. In that sense you are ‘behaviourally’
determined. Since you have been subject to purposeful
pairing in the same way that domestic pets are, in that
sense you are determined by stimuli that elicit learned
responses. Since you are a social being, you have
introjected values from significant others to whom you
have been exposed, and to that extent, you are
psychosocially determined.
 However, you are self-consciousness.  Because you
are self-conscious, you can imagine yourself in future
distinct situations, and you can imagine yourself over
the long term.  Because you can think about, and hence
decide for yourself how you want to act in any given
situation and, in so doing enact values, you have the
capacity to create yourself.  However, in order to gain
control over that capacity, you first have to understand
that you have that capacity (otherwise you will remain
blindly at the mercy of all the determining factors in your
life), and you must gain the skill to activate that capacity.
If you have read thus far, you have taken the first step
toward autonomy.  You have learned that it is possible to
strive toward freedom.  Now you must begin the journey
of acquiring freedom-enhancing skills; you must learn
how to impartially think through all the value decisions
that confront you every day of your life.8  Since thinking
through an issue impartially is the sine qua non mark of
philosophical thinking, gaining the skill to activate your
capacity for autonomy requires that you learn how to
think philosophically.  Ultimately autonomy is a
philosophical capture.
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8 Clearly it is not within the scope of this article to describe
impartial thinking in detail. However, for those who wish a glimpse,
it can be described as ‘a chronic (i.e., always present) willingness to
test one’s position against the strongest possible opposition.’  For a
lively philosophical account of impartial thinking one would do
well to read J. S. Mill’s ‘Liberty,’ which can be found in
Utilitarianism and Other Writings. New York: New American Library,
1962.  For those who wish practice, at least with regard to academic
issues, almost any philosophy course will be of assistance. However,
few courses focus on impartially thinking through practical issues of
everyday life. The happy exception here are courses modelled after
the philosophical tradition entitled Philosophy for Children, that use a
Community of Inquiry as the central pedagogical tool.  For those
interested in Philosophy for Children, see any of the works written by
Matthew Lipman, for example, M. Lipman, A. Sharp, F. Oscanyan,
Philosophy in the Classroom, Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1980, or any of the journals devoted to Philosophy for Children, e.g.,
Analytic Teaching, published by Viterbo College, La Crosse
Wisconsin, U.S.A.
